Israelis sound alarm as armored vehicles approach from Jordan and convoys of Muslim women, children evacuate Samaria

Convoys of Muslim women and children were spotted traveling to Jordan Wednesday from Samaria, raising concerns from the area’s residents about an impending attack.

Israelis remain on high alert after Saturday’s attack in which Muslim forces invaded the country from Gaza, massacring over a thousand Jews and taking dozens back to the Gaza Strip as hostages. 

Though Israel has yet to follow through on its promises to exact a “merciless” retaliation, Hamas has called for more massacres this Friday. Khalid Mashal, one of Hamas’ founding members and leaders, urged Muslims around the world in a speech Wednesday “to show anger” and carry out a “global jihad.”

Elhanan Friedlow, who lives in the Eastern Benjamin region, says residents have so far seen over 27 large taxi vans full of Muslim women and children approach the Allenby Bridge that connects Samaria with Jordan. Sources told Frontline News the convoy originated in the village of Al Mughayyir — 45 minutes north of Ramallah — and collected more passengers in the village of Duma before continuing its journey. Military sources stationed in Samaria say the convoy drove through fields to attempt to circumvent IDF checkpoints.

But the convoy did run into a checkpoint, where IDF personnel confirmed that passengers were reportedly carrying plane tickets. Unconfirmed reports add, however, that Jordanian authorities have stopped the convoy at the border. 

Muslim men — particularly those of military age, Friedlow notes — have rarely been seen.

Similar reports say that to Israel's north, Muslim women and children are evacuating en masse within Lebanon to avoid Israeli reprisals for attacks.

The sightings have sparked independent preparation among residents of Samaria's Jewish cities, towns, and villages. Only some receive adequate military protection against surrounding Muslim villages and are frequently subject to violent attacks. With Israeli troops spread thin between fighting Hezbollah in the north and Hamas in the south, Israelis are even less hopeful for military protection.

“It seems clear that those remaining behind are preparing an attack that will elicit a strong response from our side,” said another resident of the Benjamin region. “They’re sending their families to safety. So why are we waiting?”

IDF sources have confirmed to Frontline News that intelligence reports are warning of an imminent attack by Muslims, though no further details were provided.

Meanwhile, there are sightings of armored vehicles moving westward in Jordan towards the border with Israel. 

The unfolding situation matches predictions by security analysts from as far back as 20 years ago in a 2000 report titled Report on the Acquiescence of the Israeli Government in Palestinian Authority First Strike Preparations in Judea and Samaria.

A supplementary document, also written twenty years ago, is currently circulating Jewish communities entitled the Judea Samaria (Yesha) Defense Initiative details a plan for such situations:

The proposed system calls for a triple-layered defense to be added to Yesha’s rapid response team’s capabilities, and actually consists of three separate elements deployed in sequential zones.

In short, this is how the system works:

The first element is an Early Warning system. This is provided by a network of trained observers, each of which is equipped with communication and optical equipment that makes them capable of warning Yesha’s rapid response teams when a first strike is imminent. This first element is capable of ruining the shock of surprise and therefore makes the Palestinians less confident about committing to a first strike in the first place.

The second level of Yesha defense utilizes the early warning of the first element.  A network of interceptor vehicles, each of which carries and can deploy barriers that are capable of blocking, disabling, or destroying enemy armored vehicles before they reach the yishuv, provides this defense.

The third component of the system is a [local] defense system that is designed to destroy armored and other forces that manage to escape the second level.

The entire system is entirely defensive in nature, with no attack capability whatsoever.

It will not take the life of a single non-combatant. What it can do is save the lives of thousands of Yeshans, as well as Israelis throughout the country, indeed Jews throughout the entire world.

The Yesha Defense Initiative system is designed to increase Yesha’s ability to survive and respond to a Palestinian first strike, and thus acts as the strongest possible deterrent to one.

Individually, each component of the system in itself offers tremendously increased deterrence. Taken as a whole, however, the system provides a deterrent to first strike planners that can neutralize the threat of eviction of Yesha.

An important fact to remember, however, is that the early warning, interceptors, and [local] defense systems are not easily separated.  To install the. . .defense without initiating the early warning and interceptors would buy very little time, before the Palestinians came up with a way to overwhelm the yishuv defense system. Nachaliel Office for Yesha’s experts have determined that all three systems are interdependent on one another for maximum effectiveness.

It must be stated that there is no such thing as a perfect defense.  The purpose of any defensive system is to delay, deter, and make more difficult an enemy’s assault.

If we continue to do nothing in the face of the Palestinian’s incredible first strike arsenal, they will grow more and more assured that they can render futile any Yeshan rapid response team’s attempt at defending their yishuv.

That certainly will only make them more and more likely to consider such an attack.

If, on the other hand, the Yesha Defense Initiative is implemented, the Palestinians can no longer be even remotely comfortable with the predicted effectiveness and destructiveness of a first strike.

That certainly can only make them far more hesitant even to consider such a strike.

KNOCKING OUT ARMORED VEHICLES

The Yesha Defense Initiative utilizes effective techniques that have been developed for poorly armed defenders to defeat an armored vehicle attack with the resources available to them.

600 Hungarian army deserters together with 13-14 year olds destroyed two Soviet armored divisions this way - 150 armored vehicles each.

In Chechnya, 62 Russian tanks were destroyed using these anti-tank killer teams in the first month of fighting there (December 1994).

These techniques are:

Organize your rapid-response team into anti-tank killer teams, which include:

1. Five anti-tank firebombers:  Five men rushing an armored vehicle are less likely to be hit than 1 or 2 men, and there will be confusion who to shoot, causing them to shoot at the crowd and miss all;
2. Machine gunner;
3. Sniper;
4. Additional personnel will be needed to serve as ammunition and firebomb bearers and as assistant gunners.

Select anti-armor ambush areas in sections where buildings restrict and canalize the movement of armored vehicles.

Lay out the ambush in order to seal off vehicles inside your pre-selected kill zone.  Try to maneuver vehicle columns into streets where destruction of the first and last vehicles will trap the column and allow its total destruction.

First slow or stop the vehicle in your preplanned kill zone, such as by dropping in front of it an obstacle, fake mine, tree, burning tires, or even a modest barricade;

Then, with firebombs ready to go, use multiple firebomber teams of 5 to engage armored vehicles from basements, ground level and from second- or third-floor positions.

Engage each target simultaneously with five or six firebombs, rushing crisscross to another hidden or covered location if that can be coordinated.  People should not be slowed down by turning around.

Aim for center of mass when trying to kill these vehicles – there is no point in a firebomber aiming for a particular little section of an armored vehicle if that will increase likelihood of missing altogether;

Have several waves of bottles ready; keep the flame going until it incinerates.

Meanwhile, the sniper and machine gunner should pin down any supporting infantry as the anti-tank firebombers engage the armored vehicles.

Remember – armored vehicles are complicated and vulnerable systems.  Just because you are a rifleman doesn’t mean you can’t seriously hurt that tank.  Here is a list of vulnerable things to shoot, thus degrading the combat effectiveness of the vehicle:

  • External lights:  Headlights, tail lights, spotlights, and infrared spotlights – all vulnerable to rifle fire;
     
  • Tires on wheeled APC’s:  Shoot these and you can cause the vehicle to run slower and with less control.  Tires also burn well.
     
  • Antennae:  Shoot these off for obvious reasons;
     
  • Armor-glass periscopes:  Shoot these out and the crew will have to expose their heads to see and fight; then you eliminate them;
     
  • Externally mounted fuel tanks:  Sometimes in drum form on the rear, sometimes rectangular mounted on the rear side fenders.  Don’t expect big flaming explosions like in movies – most of these tank engines are diesel;
     
  • Spare ammunition stored externally:  Mainly MG ammunition, sometimes missiles;
     
  • External laser range finders:  Older vehicles are often upgraded with these, since there’s no room inside.  Very vulnerable to small arms fire;
     
  • Smoke dischargers:  Usually not bullet proof.  Keeps them from deploying protective smoke screen;

Engage armored targets from the top, rear and sides. Shots against frontal armor only serve to expose the gunner. If you can place a sniper in second- or third-floor level positions, engage accompanying air-defense guns first.

BTR-152

The Soviet BTR-152 armored troop carrier was produced from 1950 to 1960, and has appeared in many variants and seen action on many fronts, including the Middle East and Afghanistan. The BTR-152 in Palestinian hands has a mount for the 12.7mm D.Sh.K. heavy machine gun.  It has a 6x6 wheel drive configuration.  It can hold 2 crew members (driver + commander) and 17 fighters.  The BTR-152 is equipped with night vision equipment for the driver.  It weighs 8950 kg and can travel at a speed of 75 km/h.  It's power-to-weight ratio is 12.29 hp/100kg making it capable of taking down the gates of any community.

BRDM-2

The BRDM-2 is a fully armored, four-wheel-drive, amphibious reconnaissance vehicle.  It has two-pairs of belly wheels and a centralized tire pressure regulation system for increased cross-country capability.

The BRDM-2 has a box-like hull with a boat-shaped bow.  The engine is mounted in the vehicle rear and there is a small conical turret mounted on the hull above the belly wheels.  The driver sits at the front of the hull on the left with the vehicle commander to his right.  To enter the vehicle, the crew must climb through two roof hatches.  The hull, which is constructed of welded steel, provides the crew with protection from small arms and shell splinters.  The turret, which is very similar to that of the BTR-60PB and Czechoslovak OT-64, is located in the center of the vehicle and is armed with a 14.5-mm KPVT or 7.62mm PKT machine gun.  On either side of the hull adjacent to the crew position, there is a firing port.  Immediately behind the firing port are three vision blocks that protrude from the outside of the hull, giving some vision to the front and rear of the vehicle.  The belly-wheels are chain driven and are lowered by the driver and give the BRDM-2 improved cross-country performance and the ability to cross ditches.  The driver can adjust the tire pressure on all four tires or individual tires while the vehicle is in motion to adjust to the ground conditions.  The BRDM-2 is fully amphibious.  It is propelled in the water by a single water jet at the rear of the hull.  The vehicle has an over-pressure NBC system.  The BRDM-2 is equipped with infrared driving and searchlights, a radio and an inertial land navigation system.  At the front of the vehicle is a winch that has 30m of cable and has a maximum load of 4000-kg.

Citizens should learn to recognize other armored vehicles because the Palestinian Authority may have them already or can easily get them from countries supporting the PA, such as Egypt or others:

Tracked vehicles or Half-tracks:  White M2 Half-track;  BTR-50, PT-76, BMP

Wheeled armored personnel carriers:  BTR-60, OT-62.